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Lower socioeconomic status (SES) harms psychological well-being, an
effect responsible for widespread human suffering. This effect has
long been assumed to weaken as nations develop economically. Re-
cent evidence, however, has contradicted this fundamental assump-
tion, finding instead that the psychological burden of lower SES is
even greater in developed nations than in developing ones. That
evidence has elicited consternation because it suggests that eco-
nomic development is no cure for the psychological burden of lower
SES. So, why is that burden greatest in developed nations? Here, we
test whether national religiosity can explain this puzzle. National
religiosity is particularly low in developed nations. Consequently,
developed nations lack religious norms that may ease the burden
of lower SES. Drawing on three different data sets of 1,567,204,
1,493,207, and 274,393 people across 156, 85, and 92 nations, we
show that low levels of national religiosity can account for the
greater burden of lower SES in developed nations. This finding sug-
gests that, as national religiosity continues to decline, lower SES will
become increasingly harmful for well-being—a societal change that
is socially consequential and demands political attention.
socioeconomic status | well-being | religiosity | economic development
Lower socioeconomic status (SES) is harmful to psychologicalwell-being (1, 2). According to one influential study, for ex-
ample, people of lower SES are about four times more likely to
suffer negative affect than their higher SES counterparts (3).
These harmful effects of lower SES are costly for economies and
societies (4, 5), but above all, they pose a major humanitarian
problem (6, 7). But does lower SES necessarily diminish well-
being or can those harmful effects be buffered? One long-held,
optimistic assumption (8, 9) has been that the harmful effects of
lower SES will weaken as nations become more economically
developed (10, 11). This assumption is based on the idea that
developed nations provide more welfare services, thereby allowing
people of lower SES to better meet their basic needs (10).
Meeting basic needs should, in turn, promote well-being (10, 12).
The fundamental assumption that lower SES is most harmful to
well-being in developing nations has its roots in the classic socio-
logical writings of Max Weber (13). Indeed, early empirical evi-
dence supported this assumption (10, 14). Scholars, for example,
found a sizable association between lower SES and diminished
well-being in developing nations (Bangladesh, the Dominican
Republic, and Romania) but a much weaker association in de-
veloped nations [Latvia, Singapore, and South Korea (10)].
Recently, however, large-scale, comprehensive data became
available for almost the entire planet, and the results revealed a
very different pattern. The associations between lower SES and
diminished well-being were largest in developed nations, not in
developing ones (15–17). This finding was sobering for politi-
cians, social scientists, and the general public alike because they
had all put their faith in the economic development of nations.
Evidently, though, the economic development of nations is not
the long-sought panacea for the psychological burden of lower
SES. It even seems as if economic development amplifies that
burden. But why?
A few initial explanations have been proposed to answer that
question, all of which focus on some economic features of nations
(15, 17). For instance, one prominent explanation holds that
higher SES is a cherished value in developed nations (17, 18), such
that people of lower SES fail to meet this value—a failure that
constitutes yet another blow to their well-being (19, 20).
Here, we test a very different explanation: It is not a nation’s
economic development per se that alters the psychological burden
of lower SES, but a tremendously important covariate of it—
national religiosity (21, 22). Eminent thinkers, from Voltaire to
Durkheim, have pointed to the role of religion in creating and
maintaining norm-abiding groups (23, 24). The resulting social
norms hold prominent positions in theories of the emergence and
perpetuation of culture (25, 26) and, ultimately, human evolution
(27, 28).
Among the religious norms that enable cultural groups to thrive
is a set relevant for SES. That set eases the burden of lower SES
(“The poor are admitted into Paradise before the rich, by five
hundred years;” Vol. 5, Book 37, Hadith 4261, The Qur’an; “For
those who are poor and destitute; May I turn into all things they
could need;” Ch. 3, Verse 10, Bodhisattvacharyavatara) and it
does so, in part, by casting a bad light on higher SES [“It is easier
for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man
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to enter the kingdom of God;” Matthew 19:24, The Bible, “The
demoniac person thinks: So much wealth do I have today, and I
will gain more;” Ch. 16, Verse 13, Bhagavad-Gita (16, 29)].
Consequently, the psychological burden of lower SES should be
the lightest in developing nations because those nations are the
most religious and, thus, uphold the relevant set of religious
norms. Accordingly, the psychological burden of lower SES should
be most severe in developed nations because those nations are the
least religious and, thus, lack the relevant set of religious norms.
A statistical prerequisite for our hypothesis is that lower SES is
more harmful to well-being in nonreligious nations than it is in
religious nations (16, 30). Some existing evidence suggests that
this prerequisite is met. In one early study of online-daters from
11 European nations, the association between personal income
and well-being was stronger in secular than in religious nations
[even though all nations were developed (16)]. In another study,
the association between severe economic hardship (e.g., shortage
of food, medicine, or medical treatment) and well-being was
amplified in nonreligious compared to religious nations (31).
In all, we test whether national religiosity accounts for the
otherwise puzzling evidence that the association between lower
SES and diminished well-being is stronger in developed nations
and weaker in developing ones. To bolster the robustness of our
conclusions, we relied on three worldwide data sets: the Gallup
World Poll [GWP; 1,567,204 people across 156 nations (32)], the
Gosling-Potter Internet Personality Project [IPP; 1,493,207
people across 85 nations (33)], and the World Values Survey
[WVS; 274,393 people across 92 nations (34); for descriptive
statistics, see SI Appendix, Table S1]. Additionally, we conducted
15 robustness checks to ensure that our results hold up against a
variety of alternative explanations.
Results
First, we sought to replicate the heretofore puzzling finding that
the harmful effects of lower SES on well-being are amplified in
developed nations. To this end, we estimated a mixed-effects
model with well-being as the criterion and SES (level 1), na-
tional economic development (level 2), and their cross-level in-
teraction as the predictors (model 1). The model revealed the
expected main effect of SES on well-being: GWP: β = 0.28, 95%
CI: 0.27 to 0.29; IPP: β = 0.12, 95% CI: 0.11 to 0.13; WVS: β =
0.20, 95% CI: 0.18 to 0.22. Moreover, the model also revealed that
higher national economic development amplified this main effect
in two of the three data sets: GWP: β = 0.04, 95% CI: 0.03 to 0.05;
IPP: β = 0.03, 95% CI: 0.02 to 0.04; WVS: β = −0.02, 95%
CI: −0.04 to 0.0001. As an illustration, in the IPP, the psycho-
logical burden of lower SES was comparatively large in developed
Norway, r = 0.23, 95% CI: 0.21 to 0.24, but that burden was
nonsignificant in developing Jamaica, r = 0.02, 95% CI: −0.06 to
0.10. The finding that the WVS differed from the other two data
sets has relevant implications, on which we elaborate in the
Discussion.
Second, we sought to provide a worldwide test of whether the
harmful effects of lower SES on well-being are attenuated in
more religious nations. Thus, we conducted a mixed-effects
model with well-being as the criterion and SES (level 1), na-
tional religiosity (level 2), and their cross-level interaction as the
predictors (model 2). In this model, too, we found the expected
main effect of SES on well-being: GWP: β = 0.28, 95% CI: 0.27
to 0.29; IPP: β = 0.12, 95% CI: 0.11 to 0.12; WVS: β = 0.20, 95%
CI: 0.18 to 0.22. Of particular relevance, the model also
revealed that national religiosity attenuated this main effect in
all three data sets (but note the 90% CI in the case of the WVS):
GWP: β = −0.04, 95% CI: −0.05 to −0.03; IPP: β = −0.04, 95%
CI: −0.05 to −0.03; WVS: β = −0.02, 90% CI: −0.04 to −0.0004.
Fig. 1 depicts the zero-order correlations between SES and well-
being across the entire world.
Third, we tested the core hypothesis that national religiosity
accounts for the attenuated effect of lower SES on well-being in
developing nations. To this end, we combined models 1 and 2.
Specifically, well-being was the criterion, and SES (level 1), na-
tional economic development (level 2), national religiosity (level
2), and the two cross-level interactions were the predictors (model
3). Fig. 2 displays the results of model 3. The top row depicts the
distribution of national economic development and national reli-
giosity across the world. Beneath those depictions, the right col-
umn shows that the psychological burden of lower SES was
attenuated in more religious nations and that this finding emerged
consistently in all three data sets: GWP: β = −0.02, 95% CI: −0.04
to −0.01; IPP: β = −0.03, 95% CI: −0.04 to −0.03; WVS:
β = −0.03, 95% CI: −0.05 to −0.01. In sharp contrast, the left
column shows that such consistency did not emerge for the cross-
level interaction between SES and national economic develop-
ment. In one data set, the psychological burden of lower SES was
stronger in developed nations: GWP: β = 0.03, 95% CI: 0.01 to
0.04. In another data set, that psychological burden did not sig-
nificantly vary as a function of national economic development:
IPP: β = 0.01, 95% CI: −0.002 to 0.02. And in the final data set,
the psychological burden of lower SES was weaker in developed
nations: WVS: β = −0.03, 95% CI: −0.05 to −0.01.
The results of models 1 through 3 suggest that national re-
ligiosity can explain why the psychological burden of lower SES
is amplified in developed nations (30). This is the case because
the effect of national economic development on the psycho-
logical burden of lower SES (model 1) was reduced when we
statistically accounted for national religiosity (model 3). A
formal test of that reduction [model 4 (35); see SI Appendix,
Fig. S1] revealed its significance: GWP: β = 0.02, 95% CI: 0.01
to 0.02; IPP: β = 0.01, 95% CI: 0.01 to 0.02; WVS: β = 0.01,
95% CI: 0.01 to 0.02. Indeed, national religiosity accounted for
much of the apparent effect of national economic development
on the psychological burden of lower SES: GWP: 42.4%; IPP:
56.0%; WVS: 56.8%.
Consistent with extant evidence, national economic develop-
ment and national religiosity were strongly associated with five
national covariates: collectivism, income inequality, pathogen
prevalence, employment in agriculture, and percent of the
Fig. 1. Heatmap of mean zero-order correlations between SES and psy-
chological well-being. For each nation, Pearson correlations were calculated
between SES and well-being. Those Pearson correlations were Fisher’s
z-transformed, averaged across the three data sets, and back-transformed to
correlation coefficients (SI Appendix, Table S1 lists the countries in each data
set). Lighter colors represent smaller correlations, darker colors larger cor-
relations within each nation. Please note that nations vary in the number of
data sets contributing to the averaged correlation coefficients presented in
this figure.
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population living in urban areas (see Materials and Methods and
SI Appendix, Table S2). We tested whether our results persist
when accounting for these national covariates. Specifically, we
ran 15 variations of model 4 (5 covariates × 3 data sets). In each
variation, we added another national covariate to the model
(i.e., main effect and cross-level interaction with SES). In all 15
variations of model 4, national religiosity significantly accounted
for the effect of national economic development on the psy-
chological burden of lower SES (SI Appendix, Table S3). Thus,
there is firm evidence that national religiosity is key to under-
standing why lower SES is less harmful to well-being in devel-


















all data sets. 
Fig. 2. Distribution of national economic development, national religiosity, and estimated means of the cross-level interactions (model 3). The top row
depicts mean national economic development and mean national religiosity worldwide (z-standardized and averaged across data sets). Lighter colors rep-
resent lower values, darker colors higher values. The three bottom rows depict estimated marginal means of the cross-level interactions when both national
moderators were included in the model (i.e., model 3). Depicted are the moderating effects of national economic development and national religiosity on the
association between SES and well-being in all three data sets.
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Lower SES is harmful to psychological well-being, an effect that
has huge costs for the economy and society, and, above all, it
constitutes a pressing humanitarian problem (4–7). Politicians,
social scientists, and the general public have all long hoped that
the harmful effect of lower SES would vanish with the rising
economic development of nations (8, 9). Mounting evidence,
however, quashed this hope; in fact, the economic development of
nations even appeared to amplify the burden of SES, not reduce it.
Here, we tested whether national religiosity can explain this
counterintuitive discovery. National religiosity suggested itself as
an explanation for two reasons. First, national economic devel-
opment is a strong (inverse) associate of national religiosity (21,
22). Second, world religions uphold norms that, in part, function
to ease the burden of lower SES (16, 29). In three large-scale,
world-wide data sets, we received consistent evidence for this
religiosity-based explanation.
We note three avenues for future research. First, the role of
national religiosity in diminishing the psychological burden of
lower SES was highly consistent across the three data sets. Yet, the
role of national economic development was not. Specifically, even
when national religiosity was not part of the model (model 1),
national economic development did not qualify the psychological
burden of lower SES in the WVS (but only in the WVS). More-
over, once we controlled for national religiosity in the WVS
(model 3), the psychological burden of lower SES was more severe
in developing nations. Future research may want to illuminate
those inconsistencies between data sets, especially in light of our
consistent findings regarding national religiosity.
Second, large-scale, cross-national surveys typically measure their
constructs by means of self-report (i.e., use of subjective measures).
In the present research, measurements of SES and psychological
well-being were no exception. In all three data sets, participants
categorized themselves into SES groups and rated their own well-
being. Thus, replication attempts may want to circumvent self-
report measures, using more objective measures instead.
Finally, the Western world has witnessed a marked decline in
national religiosity over the last decades (36, 37). Viewed through
the lens of the present research, this decline suggests that the
harmful effects of lower SES on well-being should be more severe
now than they were in the past. There is reason to believe that
religious decline may even accelerate in the decades to come (38,
39). As a result, lower SES may well exert particularly harmful
effects on well-being in the future. These hypotheses await em-
pirical scrutiny. Nonetheless, the present results suggest that social
scientists and policymakers should take note of the dwindling
levels of national religiosity and the possibility that the harmful
effects of lower SES will rise further as a result. The challenge will
be to find alternatives to national religiosity to curb those harmful
effects. Such alternatives will not be easily found because national
religiosity exerts particularly powerful effects (40, 41). The antic-
ipated difficulty of finding alternatives to national religiosity sug-
gests that the search for such alternatives should start sooner
rather than later and it should be a collective effort by social
scientists and policymakers.
In all, we found evidence that national religiosity helps explain
why the psychological burden of lower SES is attenuated in de-
veloping nations and amplified in developed ones. As such, our
results demonstrate that the harmful effects of lower SES on well-
being are not set in stone. In some of the most religious nations,
we even found that those harmful effects were absent altogether.
Materials and Methods
Data Sets.We used three data sets: the GWP [2005 through 2017 (32)], the IPP
[1999 through 2015 (33)], and the WVS [1981 through 2016 (34)]. All data
were collected following ethical clearance by either an organizational eth-
ical review board (GWP and WVS) or the institutional review boards at the
University of California and the University of Texas (IPP) and the informed
consent of each participant. We used all available data from those data sets,
but excluded participants who had missing values on any variable in our
statistical models (listwise deletion). To assure a sufficiently precise estima-
tion of associations within each nation, we followed the convention to ex-
clude nations with less than 300 participants (42, 43). In effect, our main-text
analyses rested on the following sample sizes. GWP: 1,567,204 participants in
156 nations; IPP: 1,493,207 participants in 85 nations; WVS: 274,393 partici-
pants in 92 nations.*SI Appendix, Table S1 summarizes the descriptive sta-
tistics for each nation in each data set (for more extensive descriptions of all
three data sets, see refs. 21, 34, 43).
Measures. Typically, each data set included onemeasure per variable of interest
for our investigation. In some instances, however, a data set included alter-
native measures. In those instances, we chose the single most suitable measure
(our choices and their alternatives are explained in the following).
SES. GWP: “Which one of these phrases comes closest to your own feelings
about your household’s income these days: living comfortably on present in-
come [1], getting by on present income [2], finding it difficult on present in-
come [3], or finding it very difficult on present income [4]?” (reverse coded);
IPP: “[. . .] where would you place yourself on the following spectrum for social
class?” (working class [1], lower class [2], middle class [3], upper-middle class [4],
upper class [5]); WVS: “People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to
the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you
describe yourself as belonging to the upper class [1], upper middle class [2],
lower middle class [3], working class [4], lower class [5]” (reverse coded).†
Well-Being. GWP: “Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the
bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life
for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you.
On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this
time?” (44); IPP: “I see myself as someone who has high self-esteem” (strongly
disagree [1], strongly agree [5]; 45); WVS: “All things considered, how satisfied
are you with your life as a whole these days? Using this card on which 1 means
you are completely dissatisfied and 10 means you are completely satisfied
where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole?” (46).‡
National Economic Development. Following standard practice (47), wemeasured a
nation’s economic development using that nation’s per capita gross domestic
product [GDP in purchasing power parity (48)]. For each nation in each data set,
we averaged the GDP across all years included in the data set, and we weighted
*Some of the robustness checks reported in the supplementary materials rested on some-
what smaller samples. This is the case because the robustness checks controlled for na-
tional covariates and some of those covariates had missing values. The supplementary
materials report its results in tables, and those tables include the sample sizes on which
the results rest.
†In addition to the chosen SES measures, all three data sets assessed highest education,
and the GWP also assessed financial hardship and household income. We favor the
chosen SES measures for several reasons: An independent validation study (N = 526
MTurk workers) revealed that the chosen measures correlated strongly with the McAr-
thur Scale (58), the gold-standard measure of SES (GWP: r = 0.50, 95% CI: 0.43 to 0.56; IPP
and WVS: r = 0.75, 95% CI: 0.71 to 0.79). Highest education, by contrast, was a compar-
atively weak correlate of the McArthur Scale; r = 0.34, 95% CI: 0.26 to 0.41. In line with
this result, extant research on cross-national differences in the psychological burden of
lower SES typically refrained from using highest education as an indicator of SES (1, 2,
8–10). In fact, there is no theoretical reason to expect that national religiosity can explain
cross-national differences in the effects of little education on well-being (if there are any
such cross-national differences). This is the case because religious norms do not lighten
the stigma associated with little education or cast a bad light on much education. Finan-
cial hardship was also a comparatively weak correlate of the McArthur Scale (re food: r =
0.18, 95% CI: 0.10 to 0.26; re shelter: r = 0.11, 95% CI: 0.02 to 0.19) and financial hardship
was available in only one of our three data sets. Finally, household income was a com-
paratively moderate correlate of the McArthur Scale (r = 0.51, 95% CI: 0.45 to 0.57), but
it, too, was available in only one of our three data sets. Moreover, household income in
the GWP is imprecise because it does not allow researchers to control appropriately for
household size. Additionally, people often lack sufficiently accurate knowledge of their
household income and are particularly hesitant to report their true household income
(59). In line with those issues, we did not find that national religiosity moderated the
effects of lower household income on well-being, even though extant research revealed
that national religiosity moderated the effects of lower personal income on well-
being (16).
‡In addition to those well-being indicators, the GWP assessed positive and negative emo-
tions, and the IPP assessed anxious and depressed personality [as facets of neurotic per-
sonality (60)]. We did not include the results of those additional indicators in the main
text because they assess transient states [positive and negative emotions (61)] or stable
traits [anxious and depressed personality (60)]. For completeness reasons, SI Appendix,
Tables S4 and S5 include the results involving those indicators, which were similar to the
results reported in the main text.
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yearly GDP according to the share of participants that were surveyed during
this year. Following a standard economic method (15), we log-transformed
(log10) the GDP data.
National Religiosity. Following standard practice (42, 43), we averaged person-
level religiosity within each nation for each data set. The religiosity items were
as follows. GWP: “Is religion an important part of your daily life?” [yes [1], no
[0] (21)]; IPP: “I see myself as someone who is very religious” [strongly disagree
[1], strongly agree [5] (49)]; WVS (mean of the following four items [z-stan-
dardized]): “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say
you are a religious person?” (religious [1], not religious [0], atheist [0]), “Do
you believe in God?” (yes [1], no [0]), “Apart from weddings and funerals,
about how often do you attend religious services these days?” (more than
once a week [1] to never, practically never [8]; reverse coded), “Do you take
some moments of prayer, meditation or contemplation or something like
that?” (yes [1], no [0]). The three indices were near-perfectly interrelated (SI
Appendix, Table S2).
Covariates.We sought to assure that results are not spurious due to related but
conceptually different national variables. Thus, as covariates, we assessed
collectivism [meta-analytic update of Hofstede’s original index; reverse coded
(50)], pathogen prevalence [nonzoonotic parasite prevalence (51)], income
inequality [Gini coefficient (52)], employment in agriculture [percentage of
total employment (52)], and the population living in urban areas [percentage
of the total population (52)].
Statistical Modeling. We accounted for the nested data structure (persons
nested in nations) by using linear mixed-effects models in R [mixed-effects
model package lme4 version 1.1-23, models 1 through 3 (53); mixed-effects
path model package lavaan version 0.6-7, model 4 (54)]. We z-standardized
all variables to obtain standardized coefficients (55), and group-mean cen-
tered all person-level predictors to unequivocally interpret our cross-level
interactions (56). All our models included random intercepts (models 1
through 4) and, whenever possible, they also included random slopes for all
person-level predictors [models 1 through 3 (57)]. All models included age
and gender as control variables at the person-level, but the results without
those controls were conceptually identical.
Data Availability. In the current study, three large-scale data sets were used.
For all data sets, all relevant national variables, including control variables,
are reported in the SI Appendix. The GWP data that support the findings of
this study are publicly available (https://www.gallup.com), but restrictions
apply to the availability of these data, which were used under license for the
current study. The data from the IPP that we analyzed in this study can be
obtained from the first author upon request. The WVS data are publicly
available at https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org. Analysis scripts and results
can be retrieved from Open Science Framework, https://osf.io/ur6q2/?view_
only=a7f2ff4a5e9a47f7b1f02eccbbc2a6ac.
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